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1 Introduction
A key role of markets and other organizations is ensuring that society uses the knowledge
available to economic agents optimally (Hayek, 1945). Doing so requires conserving the
superior knowledge of experts for the right questions; that is, e¢ ciently matching questions
and expertise. A solution to this problem is a knowledge-based hierarchyin which experts
lever their knowledge by having less expensive workers deal with routine tasks. Firms and
other organizations often rely on such hierarchies by placing agents in di¤erent positions
according to their expertise.1
The allocation of knowledge is complicated by the presence of two-sided information
asymmetries: both the di¢ culty of the problems posed to experts and the knowledge of
those experts may be hard to assess. As a result the market may be unable to ensure an
e¢ cient use of expert time. In this paper, we study whether or not there exist contractual
arrangements that support an e¢ cient allocation despite these informational asymmetries,
and, if so, the form that such arrangements take.
We carry out our analysis in a general-equilibrium setting, in which agents, each en-
dowed with a privately-observed knowledge level and a unit of time, choose their occupation
(production or consulting) and whether or not they wish to participate in the market for
knowledge. Problems are encountered in the course of production, and vary in their di¢ -
culty. If a producer faces a problem that is too hard relative to her knowledge level, she may
seek help from a consultant.
We start by deriving, as a benchmark, the rst-best allocation under full information.
This allocation has the following features. First, agents are split into three sets: matched
producers (who receive advice from consultants upon failing to solve their problems); self-
employed producers (who never receive advice); and consultants. Second, consultants are
more knowledgeable than both types of producers, and self-employed producers, in turn,
are more knowledgeable than matched producers. Accordingly, self-employed producers
have intermediate knowledge levels. Third, matching between producers and consultants
is positive assortative: more knowledgeable consultants devote their time to problems that
are expected to be more di¢ cult, namely, those problems that the most knowledgeable
producers failed to solve on their own. Fourth, whenever communication between consultants
1Garicano (2000) studies knowledge-based hierarchies in which ex-ante homogeneous workers acquire
knowledge and choose their positions in the hierarchy. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) analyze the
problem of knowledge acquisition and optimal organizational structure with heterogeneous agents. Both
these papers focus on economies with full information.
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and producers is su¢ ciently inexpensive in terms of the time it consumes, the set of self-
employed producers is empty. In this case, even the hardest problems are worth a second
try and all agents participate in the market.
Intuitively, team production is most e¤ective when the most knowledgeable agents (who
specialize in consulting on di¢ cult problems) are matched with the least knowledgeable ones
(who specialize in production and get help from consultants only when needed). Agents with
intermediate knowledge, in contrast, contribute to team production the least. The existence
of self-employed producers, as we shall see, is the key obstacle to an e¢ cient spot market. It
is also one of the features that distinguishes the present setting from a standard asymmetric-
information setting: in our model, the lemonswho threaten market e¢ ciency are precisely
the agents with intermediate knowledge levels.
Our main focus is on contracting with asymmetric information. We consider two forms
of contracts: ex-post (or spot) and ex-ante. Under ex-post contracting, producers seek help
from consultants only after facing a problem they cannot solve. Such contracts rely on
two pieces of information to condition payments between agents: (i) participation in the
contract; and (ii) whether or not the producer solves her problem upon receiving help from
the consultant. Under ex-ante contracting, in contrast, consultants and producers match
before producers attempt their problems (in a similar way, for example, as contracting inside
a rm). Crucially, ex-ante contracts use an extra piece of information to condition payments:
whether or not a producer solves her problem on her own.
We nd that spot markets (i.e. those with ex-post contracting) are, in general, not
e¢ cient. The reason is that self-employed producers may want to overstate their knowledge
and become consultants and/or understate their knowledge and seek advice. Excluding
them from the market would require that asking for help is costly (to prevent self-employed
producers from pretending to have easy unsolved problems) and, at the same time, would
require that consultants pay producers up front for the right to o¤er advice (to prevent
self-employed producers from becoming consultants). We show that spot contracts cannot
achieve both goals simultaneously. Accordingly, when the rst best calls for self-employed
producers it cannot be supported by such contracts.
Our main result is that, in contrast to spot markets, ex-ante contracting always supports
the rst-best allocation, despite agents contracting under two-sided information asymmetries.
Moreover, we show that there is a unique ex-ante arrangement that guarantees an e¢ cient
allocation, regardless of the underlying parameters. This arrangement has the following
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intuitive structure:
1. Each consultant matches, up front, with a number of producers and enters into a
bilateral contract with each one. Consultants with higher knowledge match with more
knowledgeable producers (and with a greater number of producers).
2. Consultants pay each producer in their team a positive xed fee (e.g. a wage) plus a
performance bonus in the event that the producer succeeds at solving her problem on
her own. The xed fee is decreasing, and the bonus is increasing, in the producers
knowledge level. In other words, as producer knowledge grows, incentives become
higher-powered. It is this feature of the arrangement that screens producers.
3. Net of the above payments to producers, each consultant is the full residual claimant of
all output produced by the team. The total expected payment from the consultant to
each producer is increasing in the producers knowledge at a rate equal to the marginal
contribution of producer knowledge to expected team output. It is this feature that
screens consultants: they simply hireproducers at their marginal value.
Crucially, these contracts are able to simultaneously screen agents on both sides of the
market. When serving as residual claimants, consultants care only about their total expected
payment to producers. Producers, in contrast, care also about the way in which the total
expected payment is split between xed and bonus payments.
These contracts also guarantee that the most knowledgeable (self-employed) producers
stay away from the market. On the one hand, those producers are willing to remain self-
employed because being matched with a consultant (under the pretense of having lower
knowledge) commits them to share their output with the consultant when succeeding on
their own. Since such output sharing is, in expectation, more costly for producers with higher
knowledge (who have a higher likelihood of success), it precisely induces producers with the
highest knowledge levels to remain unmatched. On the other hand, self-employed producers
do not wish to become consultants because, as such, they would become the full residual
claimants of the unsolved problems they consult on, a feature they dislike because they are
less capable, compared to existing consultants, of solving such problems. Crucially, unlike
ex-ante contracts, spot contracts do not allow for the above output-sharing commitments
that prevent self-employed producers from entering the market.
We show, moreover, that whenever the rst best calls for self-employed producers (i.e.
consultant time is su¢ ciently scarce), the above ex-ante contracts are the only ones that
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implement the rst best. The reason is that granting full residual claim to consultants
maximally deters self-employed producers from wanting to become consultants, as it would
force them to internalize the full marginal value of their (relatively-low) knowledge. Such
maximal deterrence is in turn required to protect the scarce talent of the most knowledgeable
consultants.
Our results are reminiscent of Alchian and Demsetzs (1972) seminal work. While they
motivate the appearance of a rm on moral-hazard grounds by arguing that the specializa-
tion in monitoring plus reliance on residual claimant status will reduce shirking(p. 782),
our paper instead shows that specialization in advising and residual-claimant status for con-
sultants solves a double-sided adverse selection problem. Such contracts ensure that experts
seek to employ producers of the right level (as more knowledgeable producers receive,
in expectation, a higher compensation) and, simultaneously, ensure that producers wish to
workfor the right experts (as the power of their incentive pay increases with their reported
knowledge level).
This simple characterization of the optimal ex-ante contracts suggests a rationale for the
organization of rms and the structure of compensation in the knowledge-intensive sector
(e.g. legal, consulting, and advertising). A salient stylized fact of this sector is that agents
with the highest expertise tend to be the residual claimants of income.2 In the manufacturing
sector, in contrast, residual claimants tend to be the suppliers of capital, as opposed to the
agents with the highest substantive knowledge about production. Our model suggests that
this structure of professional service rms is the optimal arrangement in the presence of
double-sided adverse selection.
Beyond professional services rms, an industry whose contractual and matching practices
t those in our model is the venture capital industry (with investors taking the place of our
consultants and entrepreneurs taking the place of our producers). As Kaplan and Stromberg
(2004) nd empirically, investors give entrepreneurs cash up front (akin to the xed fee in
our model) and receive equity if the entrepreneur succeeds (akin to paying the entrepreneur
a bonus lower than the value of output). Investors also hold convertible debt, which in case
the entrepreneur fails is converted into equity, so that investors receive all the equity in
the rm (like in our optimal contract). In addition, as our model predicts, higher-quality
2Evidence that law rms display positive assortative matching, strict stratication, and a scale-skill e¤ect
(more skilled partners run larger rms) as predicted by the model, is presented in Garicano and Hubbard
(2013) on the basis of US Census of Services data.
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entrepreneurs tend to give up less equity (akin to receiving a higher bonus in our model).3
Lastly, we consider two extensions. First, we consider the case in which all matching
between producers and consultants is controlled by a monopolistic intermediary. We show
that the intermediary nds it in her interest to implement the rst-best allocation while
keeping all rents for herself. This result illustrates an alternative resolution to the failure of
spot markets. Second, to expose the critical role of contingent payments, we consider the
case in which consultants cannot be paid success-contingent fees, but we otherwise allow for
general random allocations. We show that, in such case, the market for knowledge breaks
down completely, regardless of the potential gains from trade.
No previous study has, to our knowledge, examined the problem of matching consultants
and producers under double-sided asymmetric information. For a complete literature review,
see Section 6.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup.
Section 3 derives the rst-best benchmark. Section 4, which contains our main results,
addresses contracting under asymmetric information. Section 5 presents our two extensions.
Section 6 discusses related literature. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Model setup
We model an economy in which, in the spirit of Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006), agents use time and knowledge to solve problems.
Agents, knowledge, and problems. The economy is formed by a continuum of risk-neutral
agents, each endowed with one unit of time and an exogenous, privately-known knowledge
level z 2 [0; 1]. Knowledge levels are distributed according to a c.d.f. F with associated
density f . We assume f(z) > 0 for all z. Each agent may or may not engage in production,
which requires time and knowledge as inputs. When an agent engages in production, she de-
votes her full unit of time, and applies her knowledge, to a single problem of di¢ culty x: The
di¢ culty of each problem is unknown and is distributed uniformly on [0; 1] ; independently
across problems.4 The agent manages to solve the problem on her own if her knowledge
exceeds the problems di¢ culty level, i.e. z > x:
3As the model also predicts, Sorensen (2008) nds evidence of positive sorting between entrepreneurs and
VCs.
4Since the distribution F is arbitrary, the assumption that x is distributed uniformly is without loss (i.e.
is merely a normalization) under suitable regularity conditions (namely, that both z and x are distributed
on [0; 1] according to a density function that is everywhere positive).
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Occupations. Agents sort into one of two occupations: production and consulting. Pro-
ducers initially attempt to solve their respective problems on their own. Those who fail may
opt to seek advice from consultants. Consultants do not spend any time on production. In-
stead, they specialize on transferring knowledge to producers who seek advice. Transferring
knowledge consumes h (help) units of consultant time per problem, with h 2 (0; 1); and,
for simplicity, consumes no additional producer time. A producer who seeks advice from
a consultant manages to solve her problem if the knowledge of the consultant exceeds the
problems di¢ culty level. Whether or not a producer receives advice, she dedicates her full
unit of time to working on a single problem.
Teams and output. Producers may either never seek advice or form teams with con-
sultants. Teams, in turn, may be formed either ex-ante (before producers attempt their
problems) or ex-post (after producers have failed their problems).5
Throughout, we describe teams as pointwise matches between a number of producers of
a given type z and a consultant of a given type m; while allowing the number of producers
in the team to be non integer. The literal interpretation of such pointwise matching is that
a small interval of producers (z   "1; z + "1) is matched with a small interval of consultants
(m   "2;m + "2) with the requirement that the combined mass of consultants in the team,
namely, F (m + "2)   F (m   "2), is h times as large as the mass of problems left unsolved
by the producers in the team, which from Suns (2006) exact Law of Large Numbers, equalsR z+"1
z "1 (1 t)dF (t) with probability one.6 This requirement ensures that the combined measure
of consultant time is fully occupied and all producers with unsolved problems receive advice.
Pointwise matching (potentially involving a non-integer number of producers) simply serves
as a convenient approximation for the case in which "1 and "2 are taken to be arbitrarily
small.7
Note that we restrict attention from the outset to matching arrangements in which all
5We restrict attention to teams with a single layer of consultants. See, for example, Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) for an analysis of multi-layered hierarchies in a full-information setting.
6Such instance of the exact Law of Large Numbers follows from Suns (2006) Corollary 2.9 (which implies
that, with probability one, the sample distribution of problem di¢ culties is uniform) and his Corollary 2.10
(which implies that, with probability one, the mass of problems solved by a positive-measure interval of
producers equals the integral over this interval of the expected success level z for each producer). We are
grateful to Yeneng Sun for pointing out this fact.
7Note that this interpretation of team formation is meaningful despite the facts that: (1) the number of
problems left unsolved by a single producer is not deterministic; (2) the number of problems that a single
consultant can advise on (namely, 1h ) need not be an integer; and (3) the density of problems left unsolved by
producers of type z (namely, (1  z) f(z)) is generically not equal to the density of problems that consultants
of type m can advise on (namely, 1hf(m)).
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producers matched with a given consultant have the same type. This restriction is without
loss because we seek e¢ cient contractual arrangements, all of which, as we show in Section
3, exhibit (strict) positive-assortative matching.
A solved problem generates a value of $1 and an unsolved problem generates a value
of $0. Accordingly, the output generated by the various possible arrangements above is as
follows:
 A producer who never seeks advice generates an expected output equal to z:
 From an ex-post standpoint, if a consultant of typem devotes her unit of time to advise
1
h
producers of type z < m with unsolved problems, the expected output of such team
is
(m; z)  1
h
Prob[x < m j x  z] = 1
h
 m  z
1  z ;
where Prob[x < m j x  z] is the conditional probability that the problem is solved
once the producer receives advice given that the producer initially failed. We refer to
(m; z) as the ex-post production function.Note that this function is supermodular
(i.e. mz > 0). Intuitively, higher consultant knowledge is more valuable, in the
margin, when applied to a harder problem. Harder problems, in turn, are precisely
those left unsolved by more knowledgeable producers.
 From an ex-ante standpoint, each producer with knowledge z will need help with
probability (1  z). Thus, a consultant of type m is able to form a team with n(z) 
1
h(1 z) producers of type z; as, in expectation, these producers need help on
1
h
problems.
(While the number of problems left unsolved by those n(z) producers is random, the
fact that matching actually occurs between small intervals of types on either side allows
us to treat such number of unsolved problems as deterministic.) The expected output
of such team is
(m; z)  n(z)z + n(z)(1  z)m  z
1  z = n(z)m:
We refer to (m; z) as the ex-ante production function.Note that this function is
also supermodular (i.e. mz > 0). Intuitively, since the consultants type only matters
when advice is given,  inherits the supermodularity of :
Note a key di¤erence between the ex-ante and ex-post production functions. A producer
with a higher type is more valuable from an ex-ante standpoint (z > 0), as she is less likely
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to require advice. In contrast, a producer with a higher type is less valuable from an ex-post
standpoint (z < 0), as a problem left unsolved by a more knowledgeable producer is, in
expectation, more di¢ cult.
Contracts and timing. Contracts are pairwise agreements between a consultant and each
producer in her team. We consider two types of contracts, which di¤er in their timing and
thus in the information that can be used to condition payments: ex-post (or spot) and
ex-ante.
Under ex-post contracting, timing is as follows. First, agents choose their occupations and
producers attempt their problems. Second, each producer who failed to solve her problem
decides whether or not to enter into a spot contract with a consultant. If she does not, the
producers problem remains unsolved. If she does, the producer receives advice and a xed
transfer w 2 R from the consultant. In addition, the proceeds from the problem are split
between the consultant and the producer according to shares  and 1   , with  2 [0; 1]:
Since there are only two possible outcomes (the problem is either solved or not) an ex-post
contract of the form hw; i is without loss.8
Under ex-ante contracting, timing is as follows. First, agents choose their occupations.
Second, each producer may or may not enter into an ex-ante contract with a consultant. If
she does not, she remains in autarchy. If she does, the producer receives a xed transfer
! 2 R up front from the consultant. Third, each producer in a team attempts her problem
and seeks advice if needed. If the producer solves the problem on her own, the producer
obtains a share  (for bonus) of output and the consultant obtains a share 1   , with
 2 [0; 1] : If instead the producer receives help from the consultant, output is split between
the consultant and the producer according to shares  and 1   . The key distinction vis-
a-vis ex-post contracts is that ex-ante contracts may condition payments on an additional
event: whether or not the producer solves the problem on her own. Since there are only
three possible outcomes, an ex-ante contract of the form h!; ; i is without loss.
Note that ex-post contracting is a special case of ex-ante contracting. Indeed, any ex-post
contract hw; i can be replicated by an ex-ante contract that sets h!; ; i = hw; ; 1  wi :
Equivalently, ex-post contracting is formally identical to ex-ante contracting with the ad-
ditional restriction that  = 1   !. It is worth pointing out that since ex-ante contracts
are more general, teams are always weakly better o¤, by assumption, when they use such
8We restrict  to lie in [0; 1] to prevent budget-breaking schemes in which a player acquires a negative
share of output. We impose the same restriction on the share  dened below. Such restriction prevents
incentives to sabotage output and is standard in the literature (see, for example, Eswaran and Kotwal, 1984).
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contracts. Therefore, our model is not suitable for providing a complete theory of when
ex-ante, rather than ex-post, contracts are used in practice. What our model will deliver is
an important advantage of ex-ante contracts as well as a characterization of their optimal
shape.9
Although the main focus of our paper is the case in which the agentsknowledge z is
unobservable, it is useful to rst analyze the full-information case. All omitted proofs are in
the Appendix.
3 Benchmark: the rst-best allocation
Consider a fully informed planner who wishes to maximize social surplus. The planner selects
the occupation of each agent and a match between producers and consultants. Without
loss, we focus in this section on ex-ante matching in which the planner selects a match
before producers have attempted their problems, with the understanding that consultants
will o¤er advice on the unsolved problems of the producers they are matched with. Let
Z; I  [0; 1] denote the sets of matched producers and unmatched (i.e. self-employed)
producers, respectively, and let M  [0; 1] denote the set of consultants. (Note that the
planner wishes to match all consultants because an unmatched consultant would deliver zero
output.)10
We begin with some basic properties of any optimal allocation:
Lemma 1 A surplus-maximizing allocation has the following features (except at most over
a zero-measure subset of the type space):
1. Positive-assortative matching. Matching between producers and consultants is
(strictly) positive assortative in the sense that if a producer of type z is allocated to
a consultant of type m it cannot be that a producer of type z0 > z is allocated to a
consultant of type m0  m:
2. Producer/consultant stratication. The set Z [ I of producers lies below the set
M of consultants.
9In practice, ex-ante contracting may entail costs relative to spot contracting, including the need for
consultants to contract up front with a number of suitable producers and to cope with a potentially-random
number of questions asked by those producers. Throughout the paper we abstract from such costs.
10The results in this section generalize the results of Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004), who focus on
a uniform type distribution F , and extend the results in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) to the case in
which skills are exogenous.
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3. Within-producer stratication. The set Z of matched producers lies below the set
I of self-employed producers.
Intuition for each part is as follows. Positive-assortative matching is optimal since the
output function (m; z) = n(z)m is supermodular and so higher consultant knowledge is
best exploited when applied to a harder problem. Producer/consultant stratication follows
from the fact that the marginal value of knowledge is higher for a consultant than it is for
a producer, which in turn follows from the fact that a consultant leverages his knowledge
by applying it to more than one problem.11 Consequently, the planner optimally allocates
only the most knowledgeable agents to consulting. Within-producer stratication is optimal
because, provided the planner wishes consultants to attempt only a fraction of the producers
unsolved problems, it is best that consultants attempt the problems that are, on average,
easiest to solve. These are precisely the problems that come from producers with the lowest
types.
From this Lemma we immediately obtain:
Corollary 1 A surplus-maximizing allocation consists of a partition of the type space into
three intervals, [0; z1]; (z1; z2); [z2; 1], such that:
A. Agents in [0; z1] are matched producers who seek advice if needed.
B. Agents in (z1; z2) are self-employed producers who never seek advice.
C. Agents in [z2; 1] are consultants.
D. There is (strict) positive-assortative matching between producers in [0; z1] and consultants
in [z2; 1]:
The diagram below summarizes parts A-C.
11Indeed, the marginal value of knowledge in the hands of a consultant is equal to the number of producers
he is matched with (i.e. @@m(m; z) = n(z) > 1); the marginal value of knowledge in the hands of a self-
employed producer is 1 (since the expected output of such a producer is z); and the marginal value of
knowledge in the hands of a matched producer is no greater than 1 (the reason is that when a single matched
producer succeeds with dz higher probability, hdz units of consultant time are freed in expectation, which the
consultant in turn uses ex-ante to build a larger team by adding 11 z0 dz previously self-employed producers
of some type z0; who in expectation consume the full h  dz units of the freed consultant time since these
newly matched producers generate 11 z0 dz m units of output with the help of the consultant, and produced
only 11 z0 dz  z0 units of output when self-employed, total output grows by 11 z0 dz  [m  z0]  dz).
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self-employed| {z }
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_________| {z }
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1
In order to match producers and consultants, the planner selects a function M : Z  !
M that assigns to each matched producer z a consultant m = M(z): Positive-assortative
matching means that M is an increasing function. When selecting M , the planner must
satisfy a simple resource constraint. Fix the producer cuto¤ type z1: For any type z 2 Z,
the total time required to consult on the problems left unsolved by producers in the interval
[z; z1] must equal the total time available to consultants in the interval [M(z); 1]:
h
Z z1
z
(1  t)dF (t) =
Z 1
M(z)
dF (m) for all z  z1: (1)
For any given z1; there is a unique increasing function M(z) that satises the above con-
straint, namely, the function satisfying M(z1) = 1 and
M 0(z) = h(1  z) f(z)
f(M(z))
for all z  z1; (2)
which follows from di¤erentiating (1) with respect to z: Denote such functionM(z; z1): Note
that the consultant cuto¤ type z2 is also uniquely determined by z1; namely, z2 = M(0; z1):
Let z1 denote a surplus-maximizing value for z1 (a function of both F and h) and let
z2 = M(0; z

1) denote the associated optimal value of z2. For notational simplicity, let
M(z) M(z; z1) denote the corresponding optimal matching function and let Z(m) denote
the inverse ofM(z) (namely, consultant m is optimally matched with producer z = Z(m)):
Lemma 2 There is a unique surplus-maximizing allocation. Depending on the value of the
helping cost h, this allocation takes one of two forms, depending on whether or not having
self-employed producers is e¢ cient:
1. An interior solutionwith z1 < z

2 (i.e. I 6= ?) and
1
h
  z2 =
Z 1
z2
n (Z(t)) dt: (3)
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2. A corner solutionwith z1 = z

2 (i.e. I = ?) and
1
h
  z2 
Z 1
z2
n (Z(t)) dt: (4)
Moreover, for any given F : (a) there exists a unique number h0(F ) 2 (0; 1) such that
z1 < z

2 if and only if h > h0(F ); and (b) z

1 is decreasing in h:
Intuition is as follows. Part 1 corresponds to an interior solution for the cuto¤ z1 and
equation (3) describes the corresponding rst-order condition. This rst-order condition has
a simple interpretation. Consider a marginal increase in z1 that has the e¤ect, owing to
the planners resource constraint, of transforming one more agent (namely, agent z2) into a
consultant. The L.H.S. measures the net gain along the extensive margin: on the one hand,
the highest-type consultant is now free to solve 1
h
unsolved problems of types marginally
above z1 (who were original self-employed); on the other hand, agent z

2 no longer produces
her original level of surplus z2 : The R.H.S. measures the combined loss along the intensive
margin: every single producer z below z1 is now matched with a marginally worse consultant
(since every consultant is matched with a marginally better producer), which in turn lowers
the output of producer zs team by @
@m
(M(z); z) = n (z). Part 2 corresponds to a corner
solution for z1 and inequality (4) states that, when increasing z1 the net gain along the
extensive margin is no lower than the combined loss along the intensive margin.
Finally, the last part of the Lemma implies that the e¢ cient set of matched producers
grows as the helping cost h falls. The reason is that, when o¤ering advise is less time
consuming, production in teams becomes more e¢ cient relative to self-employment.
The First Welfare Theorem implies that when types are full information, a decentralized
competitive equilibrium delivers the rst best. Indeed, in Section 1 of the Supplement
(available online) we show that, under full information, the rst best is achieved under a
variety of contractual arrangements, all of which lead to the same payo¤s.12 Once double-
sided asymmetric information is introduced, in contrast, the set of contractual arrangements
supporting the rst best is signicantly reduced.
For future reference, we describe some properties of the full-information competitive-
equilibrium payo¤s for the interior case with self-employment (see Figure 1 for an illustra-
12The Supplement also shows that, by means of suitable contracts, the rst best is achieved in a competitive
equilibrium even when there is one-sided asymmetric information. For instance, in a referral market in
which consultants are the residual claimants of output, the rst best is implemented even when consultant
types are unknown.
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Figure 1: Full-information payo¤s for F uniform and h = 0:8: (The equilibrium occupation
thresholds are z1 = 0:58 and z

2 = 0:67:)
tion). First, the marginal producer z1 and the marginal consultant z

2 earn their autarky
payo¤s. Second, the payo¤s of consultants grow with their type at rate n(z); which is the
marginal contribution of consultant skill to team output (m; z): Third, the agents who
obtain the highest gains from trade are those at the extremes of the type space.13
In what follows, we restrict attention to the interior case in which the rst-best allocation
involves self-employed producers i.e. the case in which consultant time is su¢ ciently scare.
In the Supplement we extend our results to the corner case with no self-employed producers.
4 Two-sided adverse selection: optimal contracts
We now turn to the case in which the agentsknowledge levels are private information. In
order to obtain more favorable contractual terms, agents may wish to misrepresent their
knowledge. Consultants, on the one hand, may want to overstate their knowledge in order
to exaggerate their contribution to team output. Producers, on the other hand, may want to
either understate or overstate their knowledge depending on whether they contract ex-post
13Indeed, the agents with the highest knowledge levels benet from being able to leverage their knowledge
by serving as consultants, whereas the agents with the lowest knowledge levels benet from being able to
pose problems that are relatively easy to solve. In contrast, agents with intermediate knowledge levels
provide limited value as both producers (since they pose problems that are relatively hard to solve) and as
consultants (since their knowledge is low relative to that of other consultants). For this reason, agents with
intermediate knowledge obtain particularly low (even zero) gains from trade.
14
(in which case higher knowledge is undesirable) or ex-ante (in which case higher knowledge
is desirable).
We are interested throughout in characterizing the family, or families, of contracts
h!(z); (z); (z)iz2[0;z1 ]
that implement the rst best. In what follows, to avoid notational clutter, let M() denote
the rst-best matching function M() and let Z() denote its inverse Z(): In addition, let
Z = [0; z1 ] ; I = (z1 ; z2) ; andM = [z2 ; 1] :
We are interested in truth-telling mechanisms of the form h!(z); (z); (z);M(z)iz2Z . A
mechanism works as follows. After agents sort into occupations, they are invited to report
their types to an abstract mechanism designer, with producers invited to report a type in
Z [ I and consultants invited to report a type in M. First, if a producer reports a type
z0 2 Z she is matched with consultantM(z0) under the bilateral contract h!(z0); (z0); (z0)i :
Second, if a producer reports a type z0 2 I she is left unmatched (i.e. becomes self employed).
Third, if a consultant reports type m0 2 M she is matched with n(z0) producers of type
z0 = Z(m0) under bilateral contracts h!(z0); (z0); (z0)i : Finally, any agent who does not
participate in the mechanism is left unmatched.
We say that a family of contracts h!(z); (z); (z)iz2Z implements the rst best if the
mechanism h!(z); (z); (z);M(z)iz2Z induces truth telling once agents have sorted into
their e¢ cient occupations and, in addition, the mechanism induces agents to select their
e¢ cient occupations up-front.
The expected payo¤s for agents who participate in the mechanism are as follows:14
1. A producer of type z 2 [0; 1] who reports type z0 2 Z receives
R(z; z0) = !(z0) + z(z0) + (M(z0)  z) (1  (z0));
where z is the probability that the producer solves her problem on her own, and
M(z0)   z = (1  z) M(z0) z
1 z is the probability that she seeks advice from consultant
M(z0) and manages to solve her problem upon seeking such advice:
2. A producer of type z 2 [0; 1] who reports type z0 2 I receives her self-employment
14A non-participating producer of type z receives her self-employment payo¤ z and a non-participating
consultant receives zero.
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payo¤ z:
3. A consultant of type m 2 [0; 1] who reports type m0 2M receives
S(m;m0) = n(z0) [ !(z0) + z0 (1  (z0)) + (m  z0)(z0)] for z0 = Z(m0);
where z0 is the probability that each producer z0 she is matched with solves her problem
on her own, andm z0 = (1  z0) m z0
1 z0 is the probability that producer z
0 requires advice
from consultant m and solves her problem conditional on receiving such advice.
For future reference, note that both R(z; z0) and S(m;m0) are linear in true type, with
Rz(z; z
0) = (z0) + (z0)  1 and Sm(m;m0) = (Z(m0))n(Z(m0)): (5)
Accordingly, R has increasing di¤erences in z and ((z0) + (z0)   1) and S has increasing
di¤erences in m and (Z(m0))n(Z(m0)):
With slight abuse of notation, let R(z) = R(z; z) and S(m) = S(m;m) denote, respec-
tively, the payo¤s of a producer in Z and a consultant inM who report their types truthfully.
Note, nally, that R and S satisfy the condition that team surplus ((M(z); z) = n(z)M(z))
is fully allocated within each team:
S(M(z)) + n(z)R(z) = n(z)M(z) for all z 2 Z: (TS)
4.1 Incentive and occupational constraints
The following are necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a family of ex-ante contracts to
implement the rst best in the presence of self-employment:
First, the relevant incentive constraints within the e¢ cient set of producers are met:
R(z)  R(z; z0) for all z; z0 2 Z: (IC1)
Second, the relevant incentive constraints within the e¢ cient set of consultants are met:
S(m)  S(m;m0) for all m;m0 2M: (IC2)
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Third, and nally, every agent nds it optimal to select her rst-best occupation:
R(z)  max

z; max
m02M
S(z;m0)

for all z 2 Z; (i)
S(m)  max

m;max
z02Z
R(m; z0)

for all m 2M; (ii)
z  max

max
z02Z
R(z; z0); max
m02M
S(z;m0)

for all z 2 I: (iii)
We refer to these three inequalities collectively as the occupational-sorting constraints.15
We now simplify the above ve constraints following standard steps. We begin with the
incentive constraints (IC1) and (IC2). Making use of the Envelope Theorem (e.g. Milgrom
and Segal, 2002, Theorem 2), together with the derivatives ofR and S in (5), these constraints
are each reduced to two simple conditions:
On the one hand, the producer incentive constraints (IC1) are met if and only if
R(z) = R(0) +
Z z
0
[(t) + (t)  1]| {z }
R0(t)
dt for all z 2 Z; (ER)
R0(z) = (z) + (z)  1 is nondecreasing in z; (MR)
where (ER) is the usual envelope condition that captures local incentive constraints and
(MR) is the relevant monotonicity condition that ensures that all incentive constraints are
met globally (across producers in Z).
On the other hand, the consultant incentive constraints (IC2) are met if and only if
S(m) = S(z2) +
Z m
z2
(Z(t))n(Z(t))| {z }
S0(t)
dt for all m 2M; (ES)
S 0(m) = (Z(m))n(Z(m)) is nondecreasing in m; (MS)
where, as before, (ES) is the usual envelope condition that captures local incentive constraints
and (MS) is the relevant monotonicity condition that ensures that all incentive constraints
15The rst inequality indicates that no matched producer wishes to become either a self-employed producer
(and receive her autarky payo¤ z) or a consultant (and receive payo¤maxm0 S(z;m0)). The second inequality
indicates that no consultant wishes to become either a self-employed producer (and receive her autarky payo¤
m) or a matched producer (and receive payo¤ maxz0 R (m; z)). The third inequality indicates that no self-
employed producer wishes to become either a matched producer (and receive payo¤ maxz0 R(z; z0)) or a
consultant (and receive payo¤maxm0 S(z;m0)).
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are met globally (across consultants inM).
We now turn to the occupational-sorting constraints (i)-(iii). The following Remark,
which relies on standard results, indicates that these constraints can be reduced to two
equalities (those in (PC)) and two inequalities (those in (DDR) and (DDS)).
Remark 1 Suppose the rst best prescribes self-employment (I 6= ?) and suppose the family
of contracts h!(z); (z); (z)iz2Z satises (IC1) and (IC2): Then, that family of contracts
satises the occupational-sorting constraints (i)-(iii) if and only if:
1. The agentsequilibrium payo¤s are continuous at z1 and z

2:
R(z1) = z

1 ; S(z

2) = z

2 : (PC)
2. The directional derivatives of R and S satisfy:
R0(z1 )  1; (DDR)
1  S 0(z2+); (DDS)
(where R0(z1 ) denotes the left-hand derivative of R at z1 and S 0(z2+) denotes the
right-hand derivative of S at z2).
Intuition is as follows. The agentsequilibrium payo¤s are given by the function
V (z) =
8>><>>:
R(z) for all z 2 Z;
z for all z 2 I;
S(z) for all z 2M:
Note that V is the upper envelope of the payo¤s that agents can obtain under the family of
available contracts, and, under any such contract, payo¤s are continuous in type. It follows
that V must be continuous in type, which delivers (PC). Moreover, it follows that at every
point z the directional derivatives of V must satisfy V 0(z )  V 0(z+); which delivers (DDR)
and (DDS).16
16See Milgrom and Segal (2002), Theorem 1. Indeed, if instead the payo¤R(z) of matched producers was
steeper than the payo¤ z of self-employed producers at the cuto¤ type z1 ; then agents marginally to the left
of z1 would prefer to be self-employed. Similarly, if the payo¤ z of self-employed agents was steeper than
the payo¤ of consultants at the cuto¤ type z2 ; then agents marginally to the right of z

2 would prefer to be
self employed.
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Conversely, (DDR) and (DDS) together with the monotonicity conditions ensure that
R(z) is (weakly) atter than z and that S(z) is (weakly) steeper than z. Accordingly, it
su¢ ces that the occupational sorting constraints are met at the occupational boundaries z1
and z2 ; which is guaranteed by (PC):
In summary, the relevant constraints are the within-occupation incentive constraints
(captured by (ER), (MR), (Es), and (Ms)) and the occupational-sorting constraints (captured
by (PC), (DDR), and (DDS)).
4.2 A necessary condition for optimality: consultants as residual
claimants
We now prove a result that will become a central building block for the results that follow:
Lemma 3 Suppose the rst best prescribes self-employment (I 6= ?). Then, the family of
contracts h!(z); (z); (z)iz2Z implements the rst best only if (z) = 1 for every z 2 Z:
Intuitively, granting full residual claim to consultants is the only way to prevent agents
with low knowledge from entering the consulting occupation. To see why, note that the
highest consultant m = 1 must receive all gains from trade when contracting with her
producers z1 , as such producers are held to their reservation payo¤s z

1 . Accordingly, the
payo¤ of m = 1 is pinned down at the highly-attractive level 1
h
(which is the highest possible
payo¤ that any agent in the economy can hope to get). Granting m = 1 such a high
payo¤ causes a problem for the mechanism designer: since consultant payo¤s are necessarily
continuous in type, many agents will in principle wish to become consultants and earn
payo¤s similar to that of m = 1. As a result, the designers problem becomes, de facto, one
of maximally deterring self-employed producers from entering the consulting occupation. In
order to achieve maximal deterrence, the designer must ensure that as a consultants type
m falls, S(m) falls at the highest possible rate consistent with incentive compatibility. This
goal is achieved by forcing consultants to internalize the full marginal contribution of their
knowledge, namely, setting (Z(m))  1:
Note that granting consultants the full residual claim of the problems in their teams
implies that S 0(m)  n(Z(m)) (which is equal to the full marginal contribution of consultant
knowledge to team output). This observation, combined with the fact that S (z2) is pinned
down at z2 ; implies that the only way to achieve the rst best in the presence of self-
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employment is to grant every consultant, and therefore every agent, an equilibrium payo¤
exactly equal to her full-information competitive payo¤.
4.3 Ex-post (spot) contracting
We begin with the case in which contracting takes place in a spot market, after producers
have attempted their problems. Only producers who have failed participate in this market.
Recall that, formally, ex-post (spot) contracting is a special case of ex-ante contracting in
which (z) is restricted to equal 1  !(z) for all z 2 Z:
The following result shows that spot contracting can never achieve the rst best in the
presence of self-employment:
Proposition 1 Suppose the rst best prescribes self-employment (I 6= ?). Then, the rst
best cannot be supported by spot contracting.
Intuitively, once consultants are granted the full residual claim of output, the law of one
priceimplies that all unsolved problems must trade for the same (positive) price. As result,
lemons(high-knowledge producers with hard unsolved problems) cannot be excluded from
the market.
To see why, recall that the marginal consultant z2 is matched with n(0) =
1
h
producers
of type z = 0, and those producers always fail to solve their 1
h
problems. Note, moreover,
that consultant z2 must become the full residual claimant of all such unsolved problems (per
Lemma 3), yielding a total expected output 1
h
z2 ; and yet must earn a low expected payo¤
equal to her autarky payo¤ z2 (per Remark 1). Accordingly, under ex-post contracting,
such arrangement would require that the consultant pay a positive xed price w(0) to her
producers. In that case, however, every self-employed producer with an unsolved problem
would enter the market by pretending to have knowledge z = 0; namely, by selling the full
residual claim of her problem, at a positive price, to consultant z2 .
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As we show below, ex-ante contracting prevents such deviation from self-employed pro-
ducers by forcing them to commit up front to share their output when succeeding on their
17This result opens the possibility that, in spot markets, lemons in the middle of the type distribution are
likely to benet from asymmetric information (at the cost of agents in the extremes). Indeed, it is plausible
that such a result would hold in a broad class of models where agents with unknown skill levels self-select
into occupations. While deriving second-best equilibria is beyond the scope of the present paper, exploring
such possibility is a promising avenue for future work. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this
observation.
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Figure 2: Optimal ex-ante contracts for F uniform and h = 0:8: (The equilibrium occupation
thresholds are z1 = 0:58 and z

2 = 0:67:)
own. Since such output sharing is more costly for producers with higher types, it success-
fully keeps the most talented producers away from the market, as required in the e¢ cient
allocation.
4.4 Ex-ante contracting
This section presents our main result: Theorem 1. This Theorem shows that, through an
appropriate use of xed wages and ex-ante output sharing, the rst best can always be
achieved. Moreover, the family of contracts that supports the rst best is unique.
Theorem 1 Suppose the rst best prescribes self-employment (I 6= ?). Then, the following
family of contracts uniquely implements the rst best:
(z) = 1; (z) = hS(M(z)); and !(z) = M(z)  hS(M(z)) for all z 2 Z;
where S(M(z)) = z2 +
RM(z)
z2
n (Z (t)) dt:
These contracts are illustrated in Figure 2. Producers, on the one hand, have the option
of either remaining self-employed or opting for a simple contract h!(z); 1; (z)i : Under such
contract, a producer receives a guaranteed payment !(z); which is decreasing in z; together
21
with a bonus (z) upon succeeding on her own, which is increasing in z:18 These contracts
screen producers precisely because they become higher-powered as z grows. Indeed, as a
producers knowledge grows she is more willing to accept a lower wage in exchange for a
higher contingent reward.19
Consultants, on the other hand, acquire the residual claim, net of bonus payments, of
n(z) problems, where z is the type of producers they opt to match with. In exchange, con-
sultants o¤er each of the corresponding n(z) producers an expected payment !(z) + z(z):
These contracts screen consultants (who would prefer, other things equal, to be matched
with more knowledgeable producers) by ensuring that the combined expected payment
n(z) [!(z) + z(z)] to producers increases in z at a rate n0(z)M(z) equal to the marginal
contribution of producer knowledge to ex-ante team output, of which consultants are the
residual claimants.
Note that consultants care only about the total expected payment n(z) [!(z) + z(z)]
to producers, not about the way in which this payment is split between xed and bonus
payments. This property is what allows ex-ante contracts, with consultants as residual
claimants, to simultaneously screen agents on both sides of the market.
The above contracts also guarantee that self-employed agents stay away from the market.
That self-employed producers do not wish to become matched producers follows from the
fact that being matched (under the pretense of having a type z0 2 Z) forces them to pay
a share 1   (z0) of output when succeeding on their own. Since such output sharing is, in
expectation, more costly for producers with higher knowledge, it induces the producers with
the highest knowledge levels (namely, self-employed producers) to remain unmatched. That
self-employed producers do not wish to become consultants follows from the fact that, as
consultants, they would become the full residual claimants of the unsolved problems they
consult on, which they dislike because they are less capable, compared to existing consultants,
of solving such problems.20
18Notice that the lowest-type producers receive a positive wage despite the fact that they always need
advice to solve their problems. The reason is that these producers are still the ones who carry out the
production activities in their teams.
19Note that in the limit as z converges upward to z1 ; producers receive zero xed wages and the full residual
value of their self-produced output, which is precisely the form of compensation received by self-employed
producers.
20Under a standard assumption on beliefs, the arrangement in Theorem 1 is robust to any given agent
rejecting every ex-ante contract and instead seeking to trade ex-post. In particular, assume that if a producer
rejects all ex-ante contracts the consultants in the economy infer that his type is between z1 and z

2 (namely,
he is considered to be among those types who chose to remain in autarky in equilibrium). One the one hand,
a matched producer will not deviate because, ex-post, he cannot receive a positive price for his problem if
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Finally, that the above contracts are necessary to implement the rst best follows from
Lemma 3 (namely, (z)  1 is necessary to deter self-employed agents from becoming con-
sultants) and the occupational-sorting constraints (namely, the marginal consultant z2 must
earn her autarky payo¤). These two requirements pin down the payo¤s of all consultants,
and, consequently, the payo¤s of all matched producers. Moreover, screening matched pro-
ducers requires that their equilibrium payo¤R(z) grows at rate R0(z) = (z); which uniquely
pins down the bonus schedule.
As we show in the Supplement (Section 2), when the rst best calls for no self-employed
producers (i.e. when helping costs h are su¢ ciently small), a contract identical to that in
Theorem 1 (except for the payo¤ of the marginal producer/consultant) is guaranteed to
implement the rst best. The key di¤erence vis-a-vis the present case is that the rst best
could in principle be implemented using other contractual arrangements as well.
Income inequality and variable pay
A testable prediction of the model is that, in the presence of double-sided asymmetric
information, the level of income inequality R0(z) across producers is directly reected in
the level of variable pay (z), with more inequality corresponding to higher variable pay.21
One could test this implication, for example, by using data on non partnersin professional
service rms.
The fact that R0(z) = (z) also allows us to discuss some comparative statics. Suppose
that the distribution F is uniform. On the one hand, if h falls, income inequality across all
producers falls, in turn reducing the level of variable pay for each producer.22 This result is
caused by a matching e¤ect: when h drops, any two producers are matched with more similar
consultants (since each consultant is now matched with more producers). As a result, the
contribution of these two producers to surplus becomes more similar. On the other hand, if
the distribution of knowledge in the economy shifts through a counter-clockwise rotation of
f(z) around z = 1=2 (thus leading to a larger mass of highly-knowledgeable agents), inequal-
unsolved. The reason is that any consultant can opt to contract ex-ante with producers of type z1 ; which,
given that !(z1) = 0 and (z

1) = 1, means that the consultant obtains
1
h unsolved problems for free, and
these problems are weakly easier in expectation than those of the deviating producer. On the other hand,
a consultant will not deviate because the best he can hope to achieve ex-post is to purchase 1h unsolved
problems for free from self-employed producers with types in (z1 ; z

2), and therefore contracting ex-ante with
producers of type z1 (which means purchasing
1
h easier unsolved problems for free) is a better option.
21In contrast, if information was symmetric, producers could be compensated using an arbitrary mix of
xed and variable pay, as we illustrate in Section 1 of the online Supplement.
22Indeed, when F is uniform, both (0) (which equals hz2) and 
0(z) (which equals h) are increasing in h:
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ity across producers grows. The reason is that, despite producers now being matched with
more similar consultants, producer knowledge is in greater demand and therefore becomes
more expensive in the margin. (Numerical simulations for this result are available upon
request.)
4.5 Empirical signicance of the optimal contract
The optimal contracts derived above shed light on the ownership structure of professional
service rms and on the contractual arrangements used in the venture capital industry. Here
we discuss these empirical implications.
Consultants as endogenous principals
Under the optimal contracts, each team can be interpreted as being formed by a principal
(the consultant) and n(z) employees (the producers). The principal pays each employee a
xed wage plus a performance bonus, and, net of these payments, she is the residual claimant
of the teams output. Thus, the optimal contracts have a simple rm-like avor that is rem-
iniscent of the contracts proposed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). In Alchian and Demsetz,
specialized monitors endogenously become principals. In contrast, in the present setting,
consultants who specialize in providing advice, and are not directly involved in production,
endogenously become principals. Note that these principals are the most knowledgeable
individuals in the economy. This arrangement corresponds closely with what we observe
in professional service rms, where indeed the most knowledgeable agents typically become
principals/partners and reward the rest of the employees using a combination of xed wages
and bonuses.23
Venture Capital and private equity
Our model captures various salient aspects of contracts used in venture capital settings.
Venture capitalists (VCs) and other private equity investors (the consultants of our model)
match with entrepreneurs (the producers of our model) and provide them with a mix of
nancing and knowledge. Moreover, both VCs and entrepreneurs place high value of the
quality of their counterparts. Our results suggest that, via appropriate ex-ante contracts,
VCs and entrepreneurs can simultaneously signal such quality.
23To the best of our knowledge this feature has not been formally explained in previous work.
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The most salient empirical facts about these relations seem in accordance with our model:
First, matching between VCs and entrepreneurs is positive assortative. In a comprehen-
sive analysis of 1,666 investments made by 75 VCs between 1975 and 1995 in California
and in Massachusetts, Sorensen (2007) nds strong evidence of such positive sorting: more
experienced investors have access to higher-quality projects. He nds that an entrepreneur
being of higher quality (a higher z in our model) explains 60% of the variance in a projects
success, whereas the value added by venture capital investors (arising from a higher M(z)
in our model) explains another 40%.
Second, contracts are e¤ectively structured like those predicted by Theorem 1. As Kaplan
and Stromberg (2003) show in their analysis of 200 investment contracts used by VCs, private
equity investors generally nance start-ups with a combination of equity and convertible debt
(or other nancial arrangements with equivalent properties). Investors give entrepreneurs
cash up-front (! in our model) and hold a fraction of equity if the entrepreneur succeeds (1 
in our model). Moreover, investors hold convertible debt, which in case the entrepreneur fails
is converted into equity, and so investors receive all equity of the rm ( = 1 in our model).
A key implication of our model in this context is that higher-quality entrepreneurs should
give up less equity 1  : This feature has indeed been a systematic nding in the empirical
literature, e.g. Kaplan and Stromberg (2004).24
5 Extensions
In this section we consider two extensions: (1) the case of a monopolistic intermediary who
matches producers and consultants; and (2) the case of contracting absent contingent pay
for consultants. In both extensions, we maintain our assumption of double-sided asymmetric
information.
5.1 A monopolistic intermediary
Consider a simple variation of the model in which all matching between producers and
consultants is controlled by a monopolistic intermediary. For concreteness, we study an
ex-post contracting environment in which, after agents have selected their occupations and
producers have attempted their problems, the monopolist has the ability to purchase the
residual claim of unsolved problems from producers and hire consultants to o¤er advice on
24We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this application.
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those problems. We allow the monopolist to o¤er contracts consisting of both xed and
output-contingent payments. We assume that agents who originally became consultants are
always free to use their unit of time working on a new problem (as self-employed producers)
if they reject the contract they are o¤ered by the monopolist.
Proposition 2 Suppose a monopolist controls all matching between producers and consul-
tants. Then, the monopolists prots are uniquely maximized at the rst-best allocation.
This result illustrates how an intermediary who hires consultants and nds unsolved
problems (in this case a stylized monopoly) can solve the failure of spot markets in the
presence of double-sided asymmetric information. Intuition is as follows. By purchasing
unsolved problems for free and o¤ering consultants output-contingent contracts that hold
them to their outside options, the monopolist is able to keep all gains from trade for herself.
As a result, she nds it in her interest to maximize such gains.
Note that this outcome di¤ers from the standard nonlinear-pricing monopoly outcome
in which quality is distorted in order to reduce consumer information rents (e.g. Mussa and
Rosen, 1978, Maskin and Riley, 1984). The reason is that, in the present setting with output-
contingent contracts, the expected transfers to consultants depend on both the consultants
reported types, as usual, as well as on their true types (since a consultant with a higher type
is paid a given output-contingent bonus with higher probability). By exploiting this fact,
the monopolist is able to extract all information rents from its clients without distorting the
allocation of resources.25
5.2 Market breakdown absent contingent pay
Here we illustrate the key role played by success-contingent consultant pay (through either
output-contingent contracts or straight transfers of problem ownership). Specically, we as-
sume that consultants can only be paid a xed fee (independent of success), but we otherwise
allow for general random allocations, including rationing on either side of the market. Note
that this is the rst time we consider random matching. The reason is that, up to this point,
our goal was to support the rst best, which (per Lemma 1) calls for deterministic matching.
Proposition 3 shows that, absent contingent pay, there is a full market breakdown re-
gardless of the potential gains from trade:26
25We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.
26An informal version of this result is discussed in FG(2010).
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Proposition 3 Suppose consultants cannot receive success-contingent pay. Then, there is
no competitive equilibrium with a positive level of trade.
The intuition for this result is that, on the one hand, the expected earnings of a producer
are increasing in her knowledge and, on the other hand, the expected earnings of a consultant
are independent of her knowledge (owing precisely to the lack of contingent pay). As a result,
the occupational-sorting incentives are fully misaligned: if an agent with a given knowledge
level wishes to become a consultant, then all agents with lesser knowledge follow the same
path.
Unlike in a standard lemons market (e.g. Akerlof, 1970), where unravelling from the top
leads to various degrees of market failure (depending on the magnitude of the potential gains
from trade), in the present setting occupational deviations from the lowest types guarantee
a full market breakdown. This result suggests that certication can be particularly valuable
in environments in which residual ownership cannot be transferred and contingent contracts
cannot be written. Fuchs and Garicano (2010) take the present result as their point of
departure and show how a simple certication process partially restores e¢ ciency.27
6 Related literature
The previous literature on consulting markets emphasizes moral hazard in the provision of
consultant services. Demski and Sappington (1987) examine the trade-o¤between productive
e¤ort and information-gathering incentives faced by consultants. Wolinsky (1993) considers
the type of incentives that must be provided for consultants to recommend a proper treat-
ment, i.e. a minor treatment for minor problems and a major treatment for major problems.
Wolinsky shows that specialization is optimal in such a setting. Similarly, Pesendorfer and
Wolinsky (2003) study the provision of adequate diagnostic e¤ort by consultants.28 We de-
part from this literature in that we abstract from moral hazard altogether and focus instead
on double-sided adverse selection.29
Garicano and Santos (2004) study a referral problem with one-sided adverse selection,
where each production opportunity is always dealt with by a single individual. Agents
27See also early work by Leland (1979) and Shapiro (1986) on licensing.
28Taylor (1995) studies how insurance can solve informational asymmetries in a context where only the
consultant can determine the necessary treatment.
29See also Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006), who study cheap talk by an expert who cares about his reputa-
tion, and Inderst and Ottaviani (2012), who study incentives in the form of commissions and kickbacks for
advisors who act as intermediaries between consumers and rms.
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skills are known, occupational choices are immaterial, and the agent who rst receives an
opportunity automatically learns its value. The e¢ cient allocation involves low-skill agents
tackling low-value opportunities and high-skill agents tackling high-value ones. Their model
also features moral hazard and, indeed, their focus is on the trade-o¤ between moral hazard
and e¢ cient problem allocation. In contrast, we study knowledge hierarchies, with two-
sided adverse selection, where more than one agent could be involved in solving a particular
problem (management by exception). Agents skills are unknown and they can choose
their occupation. Moreover, the hierarchy structure exacerbates adverse selection as only
the agents with problems that turned out to be hardest are in need of advice from high-skill
agents. Finally, in Garicano and Santos (2004) the rst best need not be achieved, whereas
we show that a simple, rm-like contract always attains the rst best.
Our paper is also related to the literature on trade in markets with bilateral asymmetric
information. Most of this literature stems from Myerson and Satterthwaites (1983) seminal
analysis of trade between buyers and sellers with private valuations (see also, for example,
Lu and Robert, 2001). In this literature, in contrast to our setting, buyers and sellers do not
care about each others types directly, players rely only on non-contingent payments, and
matching considerations are not studied. The only prior paper we are aware of that studies
equilibria in matching markets with two-sided adverse selection is Gale (2001). There are
several important di¤erences between our models. First, Gale takes as exogenous the side
of the market agents belong to, while in our model agents select into di¤erent occupations.
Second, in Gales paper all agents have equal outside options, while in our setting higher-
quality agents have more attractive outside options, which further exacerbates the adverse
selection problem. Third, Gale focuses on obtaining renements that guarantee a fully-
separating equilibrium. In contrast, we focus on characterizing contracts supporting the
rst best.
The paper is also related to the literature on management-worker sorting under full in-
formation, and, in particular, to Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006). These models
have been generalized by Eeckhout and Kircher (2012), who study general conditions under
which interactions in production between worker and managerial skills generate skill-scale
e¤ects and positive sorting under full information. As in these papers, the economy-wide
problem we study here is one of matching talent with problems. In contrast to these pa-
pers, introducing informational asymmetries and optimal contracting allows us to study the
contractual structure underpinning hierarchical team formation and, indeed, leads us to the
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nding that rm-likecontracts are the unique ones that allow for such teams to be (opti-
mally) formed under double-sided informational asymmetries. Our analysis is thus novel in
its ability to characterize optimal contracting, which was immaterial in the settings above.
We also o¤er a more general characterization of the rst best with exogenous knowledge
than previous work.
In independent and complementary work, Acemoglu, Mostagir, and Ozdaglar (2014)
consider a problem of crowdsourcing. In their model, a principal who owns a set of unsolved
problems contracts with agents (either his employees or external contractors) who attempt
to solve these problems. They show that the rst-best allocation of talent, which involves
an endogenous hierarchy of problem solvers, is implementable regardless of informational
asymmetries. Their approach di¤ers from our own in two key respects. First, our technologies
di¤er. In Acemoglu et al., in accordance to their focus on crowdsourcing, there is a limited
supply of problems and agents cannot advise each other (instead they pass unsolved problems
to one another). In our setting, in accordance to our focus on knowledge hierarchies with
specialized advisors, the supply of problems is unlimited (i.e. all agents can work on their
own problems if they so desire) and agents can communicate with each other, allowing the
most knowledgeable among them to withdraw from direct production and instead specialize
on advising others. Second, while in Acemoglu et al. the principal who owns all problems
is exogenous, we obtain an endogenous principal who acts as an advisor and is optimally
assigned the residual claim of output.
7 Conclusion
Over the last fty years, the share of the service sector in the GDP of Western economies has
grown substantially, e.g. in the USA by about 20%. Approximately half of this increase is due
to growth in the share of professional and business services, such as computing, consulting,
and legal services (Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi, 2009). While production in the
simplest manufacturing and agricultural sectors requires mostly labor and capital, production
in the service sector is knowledge-intensive: capital equipment is largely irrelevant (as seen,
for instance, in the law) and rmssuccess comes down strictly to their ability to deploy
human capital appropriately.
In this paper, we study contractual arrangements in such knowledge-intensive industries.
Leveraging expertise requires the use of knowledge-based hierarchies, where experts spe-
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cialize in providing help to a number of non-experts. A crucial obstacle to such vertical
specialization is asymmetric information  it is di¢ cult to assess the knowledge levels of
agents asking for, and those o¤ering to, help. Can contracting resolve this problem?
We give a sharp answer to this question. In our model, there is a unique and simple
arrangement that is guaranteed to organize knowledge e¢ ciently. This arrangement is con-
sistent with what we observe in practice: experts endogenously become residual claimants
of output and pay a xed wage and a performance bonus to the producers they are matched
with. Moreover, producer incentives become higher-powered as their knowledge level grows.
This arrangement simultaneously screens agents on both sides of the market because, on the
one hand, consultants care only about their total payment to producers and, on the other
hand, producers care about the way in which this total payment is split between xed and
bonus payments. Notably, these contracts are the only ones that deter self-employed agents
from overstating their knowledge and becoming consultants, as they force them to internalize
the full marginal value of their relatively-low knowledge.
This characterization illuminates contracting practices in the knowledge-intensive sectors
of the economy, particularly inside professional service rms and between venture capital
rms and entrepreneurs, as we have discussed above. Our analysis suggests that both sectors
solve a matching problem under double-sided adverse selection by giving a full residual claim
to experts on the one hand, and an appropriate incentive bonus (or equity share) to non-
experts on the other hand.
We have focused throughout on contracting as a device to solve a problem of double-
sided adverse-selection. In practice, rms and markets rely on various additional remedies
including, notably, certication and reputation. A possible avenue for future work is studying
how these di¤erent mechanisms interact. Finally, we have studied the value of ex-ante
contracting while abstracting from the costs that such contracting is likely to entail relative
to spot contracting, including the need for experts to contract up front with a number of
suitable producers and to cope with a potentially-random number of questions asked by those
producers. An additional possible avenue for future work is building a more comprehensive
theory of the emergence of ex-ante contracting in the light of such costs.
8 Appendix: omitted proofs
This section contains omitted proofs.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Part 1, which follows from the (strict) supermodularity of , is
proven in a more general framework by Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) (see their Proposition
1 and Section 3.3.4).
For part 2 we must show that there is a cuto¤ z2 such that (almost) all types m > z2
are consultants and (almost) all types z < z2 are producers. We proceed by contradiction.
Suppose the desired claim does not hold  namely, there is a positive-measure subset of
consultantsM0 that lies below a positive-measure subset of producers Z0. SelectM0 and
Z0 so that they have equal measures and they each t in an interval of length " > 0. Denote
the measure of each of these sets Q. Note that no unsolved problem of a type z in Z0 is
allocated to a consultant with a type m in M0 because that consultants time would be
wasted.
Now (1) transform all types in Z0 into consultants and allocate to them the unsolved
problems initially allocated to the original consultants in M0 and (2) transform all types
inM0 into producers and allocate their unsolved problems to the consultants that initially
received the unsolved problems of the original producers in Z0 (provided such consultants
exist and only up to the time constraint of those consultants). Note that change (1) increases
social surplus by at least 1
h
(inf Z0   supM0)Q (which is a lower bound on how many more
problems are solved by the new consultants in Z0 relative to the old consultants inM0) and
change (2) reduces social surplus by no more than (supZ0   infM0)Q (which is an upper
bound on how many fewer problems are solved by the new producers inM0 relative to the
old producers in Z0, which, given that some of those unsolved problems may be attempted by
a consultant, constitutes in turn an upper bound on how many fewer problems attempted by
the new producers inM0 are ultimately solved relative to the problems originally attempted
by Z0). Since 1h > 1, the gain from (1) exceeds the loss from (2) for all small ".
For part 3, let z2 be such that almost all z < z2 are producers. We must show that
there is a cuto¤ z1  z2 such that (almost) all producers z  z1 seek advice and (almost) all
z 2 (z1; z2) are self-employed producers. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose the desired
claim does not hold namely, there is a positive-measure subset of self-employed producers
Z0 that lies below a positive-measure subset of matched producers Z1. Select Z0 and Z1 so
that both subsets of producers leave the same mass of unsolved problems. Now swap the
roles of Z0 and Z1. Since the unsolved problems of producers in Z0 are on average easier than
those of producers in Z1, the associated consultants solve them with a higher probability
while consuming the same amount of time, which increases social surplus.
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Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by stating the planners problem as a function of z1 alone:
max
z1
Z z1
0
M(z; z1)dF (z) +
Z M(0;z1)
z1
zdF (z)
s:t:
z1 M(0; z1): (6)
The objective is equal to social surplus. The rst term is the total mass of solved problems
among those problems initially attempted by the matched producers in Z = [0; z1]. The
second term is the total mass of problems solved by the self-employed producers in I =
[z1;M(0; z1)]. Constraint 6 indicates that, per Corollary 1, z1 cannot exceed z2 = M(0; z1):
Now let bz denote the largest value of z1 such that constraint (6) is met and replace that
constraint with the equivalent constraint z1  bz: The planners rst-order condition isZ z1
0
@
@z1
M(z; z1)dF (z) +M(0; z

1)f (M(0; z

1))
@
@z1
M(0; z1) + (1  z1) f(z1) = ;
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier for constraint z1  bz; and the planners comple-
mentary slackness condition is  [bz   z1] = 0: Note, in addition, that
@
@z1
M(z; z1) =  h (1  z1) f(z1)
f (M(z; z1))
for all z1; (7)
which follows from di¤erentiating constraint (1) with respect to z1. The rst-order condition
therefore simplies to30
 
Z 1
M(0;z1 )
n(Z(m))dm  z2 +
1
h
= 
1
h(1  z1)f(z1)
:
Consequently, at the optimum, either: (1) z1 < bz;  = 0; and
z2 +
Z 1
z2
n(Z(m))dm =
1
h
; (8)
30To see why, note that from eq. (2) and integrating by substitution,
RM(x;z1 )
M(0;z1 )
n(Z(m))dm =R x
0
f(z)
f(M(z;z1 ))
dz for all x  z1 ; which in turn implies from eq. (7) that
RM(x;z1 )
M(0;z1 )
n(Z(m))dm
=   1h(1 z1 )f(z1 )
R x
0
@
@z1
M(z; z1)dF (z) for all x  z1 ; and therefore
R 1
M(0;z1 )
n(Z(m))dm =
  1h(1 z1 )f(z1 )
R z1
0
@
@z1
M(z; z1)dF (z).
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or (2) z1 = bz;   0; and
z2 +
Z 1
z2
n(Z(m))dm  1
h
:
As claimed in parts 1 and 2 of the Lemma.
That z1 is unique follows from equation (8) having a unique solution, which in turn
follows from its L.H.S. being decreasing in z1 .
31 That z1 is a maximum, not a minimum,
and is strictly positive, follows from noting that, in addition, the derivative of the planners
objective evaluated at z1 = 0 is positive, namely,
M(0; 0)f (M(0; 0))
@
@z1
M(0; 0) + f(0) =
(1  h)f(0) > 0;
where the equality follows from (7) and the fact that M(0; 0) = 1:
Finally, we turn to the last part of the Lemma. Note that, making use of (7), and
rearranging terms, the marginal contribution of z1 to social surplus is
(1  z1) f(z1)

1  h
Z 1
M(0;z1)
n(Z(m; z1))dm+M(0; z1)

(9)
(where Z(; z1) is the inverse of M(; z1)): Note that the expression in square brackets is
greater than 1 for all z1 2 (0; bz ] (since n(Z(m; z1)) > 1 for all m 2 [M(0; z1); 1]). It follows
that, for any z1 > 0; expression (9) is decreasing in h and can be either positive or negative
depending on the value of h 2 (0; 1). It follows that, whenever constraint (6) is slack, z1
is decreasing in h and therefore the desired cuto¤ h0(F ) 2 (0; 1) exists. Moreover, when
constraint (6) binds, z1 is decreasing in h owing to the time constraint (1) (i.e. when h falls
a given set of consultants can help a larger set of producers).
Proof of Remark 1. Necessity ()). (PC) follows from the fact that the agentsequilib-
rium payo¤s must be continuous in their type (a straightforward implication of local incentive
31To see why note that
d
dz1
"
z2 +
Z 1
z2
n(Z(m))dm
#
=
d
dz1
M (0; z1) (1  n (Z(z2))) +
Z 1
z2
d
dz1
n(Z(m))dm:
The rst term on the R.H.S. is positive because ddz1M (0; z

1) < 0 and n (Z
(z2)) = n(0) =
1
h > 1: The
second term on the R.H.S. is also positive because ddz1 n(Z
(m)) > 0 for all m; as increasing z1 implies that
each consultant is matched with producers of a higher type and so can be matched with a greater number
of such producers.
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compatibility). (DDR) and (DDS) follow from Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Segal (2002).
Su¢ ciency ((). Conditions (MR), (MS), (DDR); and (DDS) ensure that R0(z)  1
and S(z)  1. It therefore su¢ ces that the occupational-sorting constraints are met at the
occupational boundaries z1 and z

2 ; which in turn is guaranteed by (PC):
Proof of Lemma 3. One the one hand, from Lemma 2, the planners rst-order condition
implies that
1
h
  z2 =
Z 1
z2
n(Z(t))dt: (a)
On the other hand, the consultant envelope condition (ES); combined with the fact that
S(z2) = z

2 , implies that
S(1)  z2 =
Z 1
z2
(Z(t))n(Z(t))dt: (b)
From (TS); and the fact that R(z1) = z

1 , it follows that S(1) =
1
h
: Consequently, given that
(z) 2 [0; 1] for all z; equations (a) and (b) can only be simultaneously satised if (z) = 1
for almost every z: That (z) = 1 for every z then follows from the consultant monotonicity
constraint (MS).
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose toward a contradiction that the family of ex-post
contracts hw(z); (z)iz2Z implements the rst best. First, note that consultant z2 is matched
with n(0) = 1
h
producers of type z = 0 and that team generates output  (z2 ; 0) =
1
h
z2 : It
follows from (TS) that
S(z2) +
1
h
R(0) =
1
h
z2 :
Second, recall that Remark 1 requires that S(z2) = z

2 and Lemma 3 requires that (0) = 1:
It follows that R(0) = w(0) and so the above equality simplies to
z2 +
1
h
w(0) =
1
h
z2 ;
which implies that w(0) > 0:
Finally, given the existence of contract hw(0); (0)i = hw(0); 1i ; every self-employed
producer z 2 I, upon failing to solve her problem, would gain by pretending to be of type 0
and thus selling her unsolved problem to a consultant of type z2 ; a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. We rst show that the family of contracts stated in the Theorem
implements the rst best, namely, we show that this family of contracts meets the seven
relevant constraints: (ER), (MR), (ES), (MS), (PC), (DDR), and (DDS). Note that R(z)
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= M(z)  (1  z)hS(M(z)) (from (TS)) and so R0(z) = hS(M(z)):
(ER) is met because R0(z) = hS(M(z)) = (z). (MR) is met because S(M(z)) is increas-
ing in z: (ES) is met from the denition of S(M(z)): (MS) is met because S 0(m) = n(Z(m))
is increasing in m: (PC) is met because, on the one hand, from (TS);
R(z1) = M(z

1)  h(1  z1)S(M(z1)) = z1 ;
where the second equality follows from the fact that M(z1) = 1 and S(1) =
1
h
(owing to the
denition of S and Lemma 2, part 1), and, on the other hand, S (z2) = z

2 by denition.
Finally, (DDR) and (DDS) are met because, on the one hand, R0(z1) = hS(1) = 1; and, on
the other hand, S 0 (z2) = n (Z(z

2)) > 1:
We now show that only the family of contracts stated in the Theorem implements the
rst best. Suppose a given family of contracts h!(z); (z); (z)iz2Z implements the rst
best. First, from Lemma 3, we obtain (z) = 1 for all z 2 Z: Second, by di¤erentiating
(TS); namely, R(z) = M(z)  1
n(z)
S(M(z)), with respect to z we obtain
R0(z) = M 0(z) [1  (z)] + hS(M(z)) for all z 2 Z:
Since R0(z) = (z)+(z) 1 and (z) = 1; the above equality delivers (z) = hS(M(z)) for
all z 2 Z. Third, and nally, (TS) evaluated at the above values for (z) and (z) implies
that
!(z) + zhS(M(z)) = M(z)  h(1  z)S(M(z)) for all z 2 Z;
which after rearranging terms delivers !(z) = M(z)  hS(M(z)) for all z 2 Z:
Proof of Proposition 2. It su¢ ces to show that the monopolist can implement the
rst best and, simultaneously, obtain all gains from trade (namely, hold all agents to their
self-employment payo¤s). Assume that all agents sort into their rst-best occupations (we
will show that, given the contracts that follow, such choices are indeed optimal). First, let
the monopolist o¤er to purchase the residual claim of all unsolved problems from producers
z 2 [0; z1 ] for free while at the same time asking those producers to truthfully reveal their
types. As producers have nothing to lose, they agree to both. Second, let the monopolist
o¤er consultants a menu of contracts h 0(m);  1(m); Z(m)im2[z2 ;1] ; where  0(m) is a xed
payment,  1(m) is a bonus per problem solved, and Z(m) is the producer match enjoyed
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by a consultant who reports to be of type m. Now set
 0(m) = Z
(m) and  1(m) = h(1  Z(m)) for all m 2 [z2 ; 1] :
Note that every consultant m 2 [z2 ; 1] earns her self-employment payo¤ m regardless of
her report. As a result, all consultants agree to report their types truthfully. Since both
producers and consultants report their types truthfully, the monopolist can indeed implement
the rst-best match Z(): Finally, note that under such contracts, all agents earn their self-
employment payo¤s regardless of their career choices and reports, and therefore they nd it
optimal to select their rst-best occupations from the outset.
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume toward a contradiction that there exists an equilibrium
with a positive mass of consultants. Let M and Z denote, respectively, the equilibrium
set of consultants and the equilibrium set of producers matched with those consultants, let
 (Z) denote the measure of Z, and let m = supM > 0 denote the highest consultant
type. We proceed in ve steps. First, since consultant types are unobserved and consultant
earnings are not contingent on their success, all consultants must earn the same expected
payo¤. Denote such payo¤ S: Second, note that S  m for all consultants m 2M (as the
outside option of a type m consultant is at least m) and therefore S  m: Third, as any
agent may become a consultant, the equilibrium payo¤ of all producers is bounded below
by S: Fourth, the combined (ex-ante) output produced by all matched agents (M [Z) is
no larger than  (Z) m (as  (Z) is the mass of attempted problems and m is an upper
bound for the probability that a given problem is solved). Fifth, since each producer must
earn, in expectation, at least S  m; the combined earnings of all producers Z must be
at least  (Z) m: It follows that the combined earnings of all consultantsM must be no
greater than zero, a contradiction.
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